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Alleviating Social Disadvantages of Rapid Economic Growth: A Case for
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Application in Old Siam
Introduction
In Bangkok on May 19th, 2010, a military crackdown ended a two-month-long
conflict that escalated into the worst political violence Thailand has seen in the last three
decades. The final week of street fighting left approximately 91 people dead and 1,400
severely injured. 1 In retaliation to the violent dissolution of the protest camps by the Thai
government, red shirt sympathizers retaliated with hostile demonstrations throughout the
country’s other cities, such as Khon Kaen. 2
Nearly a year later, the general public finds the severity of the conflict especially
puzzling. Although weekend demonstrations have been a common occurrence in modern
Thailand, the spring 2010 protest lasted for weeks. This anomaly sparked controversy
over the protest’s nature; since red shirts, who are mostly poor, cannot afford to remain
idle for more than a couple days at a time.
Lingering uncertainty contributes to the overall state of discomfort of the nation.
The extent to which former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a millionaire
fugitive in exile, manipulated civilians and funded the unraveling of the drama is widely
speculated, yet still unknown. Many observers argue that the conflict was initiated by
Thaksin, but quickly grew beyond his scope and influence to reflect the hardship and
injustice the majority of the population faces.

1

Robert Horn, "A Year After Protests, Thai Elections Set," Time Magazine, March 12, 2011.
Red shirts are associated with the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) and are supporters of
former Prime Minister Thaksin. Yellow shirts are associated with the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and are
supporters of the current Prime Minister Abhisit as well as advocates for the Thai monarchy.
2

1

In support of this theory was the reluctance of the red shirts to accept an early
reelection bid offered by current Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, a week before the
eventual crackdown. Accepting this offer would have been in Thaksin’s favor since in all
likelihood it would have led to the election of a prime minister with red shirt sympathies.
Further, it would put an end to a conflict which placed many of Thaksin’s business
interests and investments at risk—some of which he retained despite his exile from
Thailand. 3 In reality, no peace deal was signed because the red shirts lacked a unified
voice—demands and opinions were erratic and fractured within. Furthermore, the
prevalence of sheer chaos was symbolic of an unorganized mass movement; rather than
the brilliant ploy of a political mastermind.
In the aftermath, Bangkok remained under a state of emergency for ten months.
Most alarming is that the official report into who was responsible for the protest’s violent
turn, has been inconclusive, and tainted by allegations of military non-cooperation and
interference. 4,5
At present, an uneasy peace reigns over the “Land of Smiles.” Thailand is deeply
divided as strong disagreements between, and within, parties persist. Unfortunately,
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s five-point reconciliation plan [see Appendix 1]—
encompassing much needed economic, social, and political reforms—has so far failed to
provide measures that satisfy all parties. 6 In March 2011, the prime minister announced
to dissolve parliament in May, paving the way for a national elections that June. 7

3

Pokpong Lawansiri, interviewed with author: Bangkok, Thailand, January 6, 2011.
Michael Perry and Ploy Ten Kate. “Thai PM Committed to Reconciliation but No Poll Offer," Reuters, May 21, 2010.
5
Horn, "A Year After Protests, Thai Elections Set."
6
Horn, "A Year After Protests, Thai Elections Set."
7
Ibid.
4
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In light of the anticipated elections, Thais remain as uncertain about the future as
ever. A yellow shirt backed victory for the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD)
would in all likelihood spark accusations of election rigging; potentially provoking a fiery
reprise of last spring’s conflict. 8 While a win for the red shirt supported Puea Thai party
may set off yet another political intervention by the military. 9 Most ominous is that in all
likelihood a national election will not bring about reconciliation, it may in fact delay it.
Clearly, dramatic actions are needed to bridge the gap between the red shirts and
the yellow shirts. As this thesis argues, the fundamental issue is economic: the disparities
between rich and poor; between the urban central region and the rural northern and
southern regions. The reconciliation plan must feature a serious redistribution. The most
visible and direct way to do this is through a large-scale conditional cash transfer (CCT)
program, which would have the crucial added virtue of enhancing the human capital in
the impoverished regions, permitting the industrial decentralization that Thai
governments have long promised but have not accomplished.
In essence, the main source of social discontent was the perception of regional
inequality produced by past rapid economic growth. This thesis seeks to understand the
overall consequences of unequal economic development in Thailand, as the rationale for
asserting that a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program is an appropriate policy tool for
the reconciliation effort. 10
Although CCTs are specifically tailored to nations’ needs; all CCTs serve two
general economic objectives. First, they seek to provide low-income households with a
8

Ibid.
Currently, Puea Thai is the red shirt supported party. In recent years, the Thai parliament has dissolved several red
shirt parties, including Thai Rak Thai and the Democracy against Dictatorship. However, from a practical standpoint
these parties are one and the same.
10
“Thailand's Riots: A Polity Imploding,” The Economist, March 18, 2010.
9
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minimum consumption floor. Second, in making transfers conditional, CCTs create
channels of opportunity and encourage socioeconomic mobility. Clearly, a successful
CCT program can also serve the political objective of reducing the resentment arising out
of inequality and the perception that low-income families and areas are neglected by the
government.
This focused form of human capital investment seeks to stop the vicious cycle
responsible for poverty transmission across generations. 11 Specifically, money is allotted
to impoverished households to supplement family income. Although programs vary
widely, most CCTs address practices surrounding education, health, and nutrition.
Chiefly these programs motivate households to foster human capital in their children by
paying families to augment household habit; thereby making them consistent to that
which is optimal for greater society e.g., requiring children attend school regularly. As
opposed to more traditional models of providing goods and services to impoverished
families, CCTs make welfare assistance conditional upon beneficiaries’ actions. The shift
in demand-side responsibility effectively rebalances accountability between recipients,
service providers, and governments.
Following the initial success of these programs during the mid-1990s in Latin
America, CCTs are currently incorporated in welfare programs of over 30 countries. 12 So
far the aggregate results have been impressive. For example, between 2003 and 2009,
Brazil experienced impressive drops in rates of inequality as well as poverty. During this

11

Ariel Fiszbein and others. Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty (Washington D.C.:
World Bank, 2009), 1.
12
Safety Nets and Transfers, “Conditional Cash Transfers,” The World Bank,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTSAFETYNETSANDTR
ANSFERS/0,,contentMDK:20615138~menuPK:282766~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282761,00.html.
(accessed September 5, 2010).
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time, the income of poor Brazilians increased seven times as quickly as the income
among the rich; while poverty fell from 22 percent of the population to 7 percent. 13
Surprisingly, Thailand remains barren of CCTs; but the nation would reap huge
benefits through using such social welfare mechanisms in its ongoing reconciliation
efforts. In the short-term, Thai CCT programs could alleviate political conflict as well as
immediate poverty, while stabilizing citizen welfare in times of economic volatility.
Additionally, such programs would facilitate other policy reforms. In long-term, these
social safety nets can propel Thailand’s economy through a more educated and
productive workforce, while also reducing levels of inequality by facilitating transgenerational socioeconomic movement.
As anger still saturates the nation, CCT programs can be vital components in
ameliorating the country’s discontent. These programs hold great potential for building
channels of opportunity for Thailand’s rural poor. Without an appropriate response such
as this, Thai society will no longer able to compromise as it once did. The most recent
unrest polarized opinions within families, workplaces, and communities to a previously
unforeseen extent. 14 Turmoil will continue unless a sufficiently strong poverty-alleviation
response, such as a CCT program, becomes part of the next government’s reconciliation
platform.

13
14

Tina Rosenberg, "To Beat Back Poverty, Pay the Poor,” New York Times, January 3, 2011.
"Thailand's Riots: A Polity Imploding.”
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External and Internal Shocks: Impacts of Thailand’s Economic and Political Climate
on Citizen Well-being in the Past and Present
Economic Overview
At the beginning of the 20th Century, Thailand was considered one of the world’s
poorest nations. Over the past 50 years, it became a triumphant example of sustained
economic growth. Surpassing other low- and middle-income economies at the time, its
average annual growth hovered at over 7 percent. 15 In fact, between 1987 and 1990,
Thailand’s economy was the fastest growing in the world—averaging above 9.5 percent
annually. 16 This impressive performance granted the country membership to the
exclusive club of rapidly growing newly industrialized economies i.e., Asian tigers.
Thailand’s prosperity continued until the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which
severely destabilized the Thai baht as well as other regional currencies. Prior to the crisis,
high interest rates attracted foreign investors to Thailand and neighboring countries.
Rapidly growing Asian “miracle” economies promised high rates of return.
Unfortunately, development money was not well monitored and projects did not produce
sufficient profit. In addition, Thailand’s banking sector was unable to manage massive
foreign cash flow; this contributed to the accumulation of foreign debt as the amount of
nonperforming assets grew. Facing bankruptcy due to an overextension in development
and investment efforts, the government was forced to cut the Thai baht from its fixed
exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. As a result, Thailand’s economy contracted by 10

15

Issara Somchai and Gwi-Yeop Son. Human Security, Today and Tomorrow: Thailand Human Development Report
2009 (Bangkok: United Nations Development Programme, 2010), 8.
16
Data,“GDP Growth (annual%),"The World Bank,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=4 (accessed April 1, 2011).

6

percent, exposing the harsh realities of its established development strategy. 17
Subsequently, the boom and bust compromised the government’s capacity to address
poverty. The economy collapsed and the subsequent reduction in tax revenues followed.
Remarkable growth as well as peril accompanies a nation as highly integrated into
the global economy as Thailand is. In essence, its economy runs on a single engine:
external demand. 18 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been strongly influenced by
performance of sectors linked to external demand [Appendix 2].
In recent years, the world has been going through a series of economic shocks;
starting from rapidly rising food and fuel prices in 2007, and continuing into the brutal
global recession the following year. Thailand is unfortunately among the economies that
are considerably affected by economic abnormalities. External shocks have a profound
effect on human welfare in Thailand. For example, the Asian Financial Crises increased
poverty incidence from 11.8 percent in 1996 to 14.2 percent by 2000. 19
As many Thais struggle to maintain a decent livelihood during the recession,
powerful forces antagonize the welfare of the disadvantaged. In the absence of
comprehensive social safety nets, the future of Thailand’s poor looks grim.
Political Overview
A decade ago, Thailand seemed among the more politically secure Southeast
Asian nations. Indeed it had a functioning parliament, growing civil society, active and
relatively free media as well as an ongoing trajectory of reform.

17

“GDP Growth (annual%),” World Bank Data
Frederico G. Sander and others, Thailand: Economic Monitor June 2010 (Bangkok: World Bank, 2010), 1.
19
“Thailand’s Official Poverty Lines,” National Economic and Social Development Board,
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/conference/papers/7_Thai%20official%20poverty.pdf (accessed March 26, 2011).
18
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In 2001, Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party was elected. It was the first time in
Thai history that a party won a parliamentary majority on its own. 20 TRT became the first
independently elected party to serve a full term. Government reforms promised better
living conditions for the poor, including improved public services and access to credit. 21
The current situation is different. The parliament is predominately made of a
small fraction of male businessmen, while most other groups are under-represented in
government. 22 At present, the government does not serve as a channel for the general
population to shape public policy. The overall opportunities to partake in politics are
limited. Corruption, illegitimacy of elections, and malpractice of judiciaries are among
the greatest concerns Thai people face today.
Thailand’s political security has plunged dramatically as a result of an
intensifying conflict begun in 2006. Prime Minister Thaksin was overthrown by the first
military coup in nearly 14 years. Supporters of the coup have listed corruption, lèse
majesté, overriding of constitutional checks and balances, and creation of societal
division as grounds for removing the prime minister from office. 23 They felt obligated to
overthrow Thaksin’s government on the grounds that he and his associates were corrupt,
and their power was based on the distortion of the political system by money. 24 Chiefly
referring to Thaksin’s populist reforms, aimed towards his voter base—Thailand’s poor.
On the other hand, supporters of Thaksin argue that elections a year later installed
a government not very different in complexion and political tactics from the one

20

"Thailand's King and Its Crisis: A Right Royal Mess," The Economist, December 4, 2008,
Ibid.
22
Somchai and Son, xi.
23
Ibid., 52.
24
Ibid., 59.
21
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overthrown, and in fact, the coup itself was unconstitutional. 25 Further, they claim that
the coup was in reality an attempt by the opposition to overthrow a leader who threatened
the status quo through his populist policies, popular among the lower and middle classes.
The perception that the Thai political system is presently structured against the
poor is reinforced by judiciary’s behavior. Although political corruption in Thailand has
been a well-documented problem for years, judicial fraud is a new phenomenon. Until
recently, the judiciary played a very limited role in politics. However, public distrust has
been growing since 2006: that year the judiciary nullified a national election and set a
precedent for future involvement in political affairs. “In the following year, it jailed
members of the Election Commission, dissolved four parties and banned 220 of their
executives for five years, froze a former prime minister’s assets, sentenced him to two
years for abuse of power…sentenced his wife to three years for tax evasion…sacked
another prime minister for earning petty amounts hosting a television cooking show.” 26
However, all judgments are against one former prime minister and his associates.
Red shirt parties have been legally dissolved several times, yet they come back with new
resilience and titles. On the other hand, no yellow shirt leaders have gone on trial, even in
regard to a 2008 protest that culminated in a seizure of Bangkok’s two airports.
The judiciary’s independence is questioned with critics pointing towards
“retrospective application of new laws…attention to the letter rather than the spirit of the
law, and failure to apply the same standards to other political figures.” 27 While supporters

25

Ibid., 58.
Ibid., 57.
27
Ibid.
26
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of current practices argue: that past politicians suffered justly because they persistently
overrode the law as means to achieving political goals. 28
The socio-economic divide in Thai society is unlikely to be mended without
strong poverty alleviation efforts. Thailand’s modern history has been marked by
frequent crises; however, this latest phase has created more conflict and insecurity than
any other in the last 30 years. 29 Although fears of an all-out civil war are unjustified, “it
is reasonable to expect more years of political confrontation and paralysis.” 30
Political Overview: Long Live the King
A profound destabilizing force is the unclear future of the monarchy. Few have
known any king other than Bhumibol. Since his ascendance to the throne in the mid-20th
century, the institution has been slipping into irrelevance. Throughout Thailand’s modern
political history, the palace served as a respected power broker during a time when
“military governments alternated with democratic or semi-democratic regime…all in an
atmosphere of military coups, attempted coups, threatened coups, and general political
unrest.” 31
Reigning just shy of 65 years, the king has publicly intervened in domestic
politics only a handful of times, but every time the majesty’s demands were quickly met.
However, the overall legitimacy of royal power and influence rests on King Bhumibol’s
charisma and his advisors’ high aptitude.
It is important to note that Thailand’s king is viewed as a demigod and general
criticism or claims of his secret involvement in politics are considered as punishable
28

Ibid.
Ibid., 7.
30
"Thailand's succession: As father fades, his children fight.”The Economist, March 18, 2010.
31
Peter G.Warr and Bhanupong Nidhiprabha, Thailand's Macroeconomic Miracle: Stable Adjustment and Sustained
Growth (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996), 1.
29
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crimes i.e., lèse majesté. This is a clear limitation to the freedom of speech that Thais are
guaranteed under both the 1997 and 2007 constitutions. 32 Although the king famously
said in 2005 that he was not above criticism, not many are ready to test this ostensible
newfound freedom. 33 Hence, the true extent to which the Thai king has been, and will be,
involved in politics is not publicly disclosed or openly talked about.
However, many are puzzled over the king’s silence on the recent violence and
other injustices against red shirts. Red shirts, and foreign observers alike, believe that the
palace has already taken sides and is no longer an honest broker. 34 This disillusionment
of the royal family’s universal adoration contributes chaos to Thailand’s political circus.
More damaging are rumors that the American born king has been heavily
involved in politics for years, utilizing military coups as political instruments. 35 This is
further cause for concern since King Bhumibol is nearly 83 years old, and the future of
the nation rests on the next king’s political aptitude. In the absence of a politically savvy
heir, the nation’s ability to operate in a true democracy will be tested.
Unfortunately, the heir apparent to the throne is perhaps the most unpopular
royal—Prince Vajiralongkorn. Although it would be difficult under any circumstances to
take the place of a highly beloved and long-reigning king, “Prince Vajiralongkorn is
already widely loathed and feared.” 36 Sex and gambling scandals involving the prince are
widely disseminated and seemingly unscathed by lèse majesté. In addition, foreign

32

Somchai and Son, 52.
"Thailand's succession: As father fades, his children fight.”
34
"Thailand's Riots: A Polity Imploding.”
35
"Thailand's King and Its Crisis: A Right Royal Mess."
36
"Thailand's succession: As father fades, his children fight.”
33
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diplomats describe the next king as unpredictable, eccentric, and completely unsuitable to
reign. 37
Unfortunately, no guarantees exist against an unwise king. Much of the public
quietly hopes that Princess Sirindhorn will ascend the throne upon her father’s death.
Although the princess enjoys a saintly image, she is third in line and there is no
predecessor for a female monarch. The royal crisis no doubt aggravates what is already a
volatile situation. In an absence of an unbiased and widely-respected mediator, future
conflicts may escalate to unprecedented levels.
The World Bank political stability index for Thailand dropped steeply from 59.1
in 1996 to 12.9 in 2008, and is likely to drop lower after the 2010 events are accounted
for [Appendix 3].38 At present, political unrest is the greatest social concern in Thai
society. In a 2010 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on human
security, discussants were asked to rank the importance of social concerns to the
population as a whole. Among the six areas of human security covered in this report, the
discussants’ highest concern was political security. 39 Citizens were worried about
corruption among politicians, corruption among officials, and overall political disorder. 40
The political division is palpable and, at least until May 2010, street protests were
becoming longer, larger, and more violent. The accumulated frustration over the
questionable political system is creating a rising propensity towards violence among
political party patrons; ultimately, transforming Thailand into a less secure nation.

37

Ibid.
Somchai and Son, 58-9.
39
Ibid., 5–6.
40
Ibid., 5–6.
38
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Livelihood under Threat
Informal Sector Work
Thailand’s pattern of externally oriented growth has placed a majority of the
population in the informal work sector; characterized as part of the economy that is not
taxed or monitored by an overseeing body. 41 This results in a flexible labor market likely
to fall victim to a volatile economic climate. Since rural households are support
backbones to temporary unemployment, risks are quickly shared and spread throughout
the nation, especially in low-income families i.e., an urban shock rapidly reaches the
rural economy through falling remittance and return migration. Such a phenomenon was
seen in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, with nearly two million people
temporarily returning to rural villages. 42
Thailand’s flexible labor market leaves the majority of the population highly
vulnerable. At present, 22–23 million people work in the informal sector and are not
covered by the social security program i.e., they do not receive benefits associated with
injury, illness, maternity leave, disability, death, child support, old-age pension, or
unemployment benefits. 43 People are left unprotected; the families are in peril if
unforeseeable consequences occur.
Agricultural Society
The vulnerability of the nation’s poor begins with the volatility of the agricultural
sector. More of the Thai labor force is employed in the agriculture, forestry, and fishery
sector than any other sectors; however, their workers earn the smallest hourly wages.
41

Ibid., 10-11.
Ibid.
43
Chris Baker, Thailand Human Development Report 2007: Sufficiency Economy and Human Development
(Bangkok: United Nations Development Programme, 2007), 8.
42
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The single largest, relatively inelastic, export is rice. Thailand is the world’s leading
rice exporter, with 55 percent of the nation’s arable land presently under rice
cultivation. 44 Despite rapid development, it is one of the few nations likely to remain a
primarily agricultural society.
Unfortunately, earning income from both agricultural exports and domestic sales is
increasingly unreliable. Although rice demand is unlikely to fall victim to changing
consumer tastes or economic downturn, it is threatened by climate change. Erratic
weather patterns cause cycles of severe droughts and floods; each year their effects are
becoming more profound. In 2010, a series of dry spells in Thailand caused major crop
yield loses—reducing output from 5 million tons of rice to 2 million in the August crop
cycle alone. 45 Other agricultural exports, such as fish, tapioca, cassava, rubber, grain, and
sugar, as well as processed foods such as canned fruit and frozen shrimp, are also
affected by climate abnormalities.
Domestic food supply suffers from an erratic climate also. A mere two months
after severe droughts affected rice production, flash floods destroyed a large portion of
farmland, causing a 30% decline in the fresh vegetable harvest. 46 Prices on common food
items, such as onions and garlic, rose so drastically that locals re-labeled these as
"luxury" market items.
As part of a primarily agricultural society, rural Thai people heavily depend on
nature to subsidize household income. The Mekong River provides a source of irrigation
as well as fishing for millions of farmers. However, the river is becoming undependable
44

Sophie Clayton, "IRRI in Thailand," International Rice Research Institute,
http://beta.irri.org/news/images/stories/ricetoday/9-2/IRRI_in_Thailand.pdf (accessed January 7, 2011).
45
"Drought, floods threaten Thailand’s rice harvest,” Taipei Times, June 10, 2010.
46
"From drought to floods and another food shortage,” Bangkok Post, November 11, 2010.
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due to extreme weather patterns. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) identified the Mekong delta as one of the three areas on the planet most
vulnerable to the impact of climate change; including rises in sea levels, saline intrusions,
and storms that destroy coastlines and ecosystems. 47
Upstream hydropower projects also play a significant role in the Mekong’s
struggle. Energy generators and irrigation systems have negatively impacted livelihood
along the river since the early 1990s. Cycles of drought and floods have become more
severe and unpredictable, increasing the likelihood of crop failure among farmers who do
not directly benefit from irrigation canals.
The development projects have also lead to declines in native fish populations.
Changes in the river’s hydrology negatively affect fish feeding, spawning, and nursing
grounds; with previous regional hydropower projects causing 30 to 90 percent declines in
fish catches. 48 Additional development on the Mekong and its tributaries may
permanently damage native fish populations. This would cripple Thailand’s fishing
industry as well as undermine the diet of those living along the river, who attain over 70
percent of their total protein from the Mekong. 49
Manufacturing
Although the manufacturing sector employs only 15.5 percent of the workforce,
exports account for more than half of Thailand’s GDP. 50 Many of Thailand’s major
47

Yoolim Lee, "China hydropower dams in Mekong River give shocks to 60 million,” Bloomberg,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-26/china-hydropower-dams-in-mekong-river-give-shocks-to-60million.html (accessed January 05, 2011).
48
International Rivers & Environmental Defense, “An Analysis on Nam Theun 2 Compliance with World Commission
on Dams Strategic Priorities,” Environmental Defense Fund,
http://www.edf.org/documents/4400_NT2ExecSummary.pdf (accessed 8 May 2010).
49
Ibid.
50
The 2009 Labor Force Survey, National Statistical Office of Thailand, http://web.nso.go.th/en/survey/lfs/lfs2009.htm
(accessed January 20, 2011).
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export goods face volatile world demand, such as mechanical and electronic components,
jewelry, and precious metals. 51 World demand for these products declined severely
during the 2008 global recession; most of Thailand’s export sectors experienced doubledigit drops, reaching 23.5 percent in the first half of 2009. 52 The inability of the
manufacturing sector to absorb people flooding in from the countryside to work at higher
pay, or to provide enough demand for decently-paying service jobs, has led to an increase
in urban poverty. With little to no formal education, nearly 58 percent of rural migrant
workers earn less than minimum wage. 53
Tourism
Thailand’s dependence on high-end tourism has been quite successful and
accounts for 6–8 percent of the national GDP; thereby making it the largest contribution
to a country’s economy than that of any other Asian nation. 54 However, as an industry it
is hypersensitive to economic, environmental, and political variables.
Global economic downturns reduce tourism revenues, but so does perceived
safety of travel. Thailand is at risk of geological instability that occurs rather rarely but
accumulates huge financial and human loses. The wave that hit the Andaman coast on 26
December 2004 left 5,395 dead, another 2,817 missing, and 8,457 injured. 55 This event
negatively affected sixty thousand people and accrued 15 billion baht worth of damages;
it also frightened tourists from visiting the country’s beaches for many months after. 56

51

The World Factbook: Thailand, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/th.html (accessed January 20, 2011).
52
Suwanee Khamman . "The impact of the global food, fuel, and financial crises and policy responses: a child-sensitive
approach." National Economic and Social Development Board (Bangkok: Royal Thai Government, 2009).
53
Somchai and Son,13.
54
Sander and others, 3.
55
Somchai and Son, 24-5.
56
Ibid.
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Over the last few years, fears have significantly diminished. Unfortunately, the tectonic
plates which caused the 2004 mega tsunami are among the most active in the world. 57
The chances of an equally devastating event occurring in the near future are slim, yet not
completely improbable.
Thailand’s hostile political climate poses the greatest threat to its tourist industry
as the nation becomes more unstable in the eyes of the world. The economic impact of
the 2009 airport closure lasted for about two quarters beyond the resolution of the
immediate crisis. While the political unrest in April and May of 2010 caused a large
decline in number of foreign visitors as governments warned their citizens against
coming to Thailand; resulting in a 50 percent drop in foreign arrivals to Bangkok’s
Suvarnabhumi airport. The conflict was estimated to have caused GDP to contract by
over 4 percent from the previous quarter. 58 Future conflicts will undoubtedly reaffirm
Thailand reputation as an increasingly unstable country.
Consequences of Civil Unrest
The World Bank’s June 2010 Thailand Economic Monitor report states that the
2010 conflict’s impact on domestic demand will likely be significant as increased
uncertainty leads to precautionary behavior in consumers and investors alike. The only
sectors which are expected to be relatively unaffected by the crisis are manufacturing and
logistics. However, they account for only 17 percent of the labor force; while sectors
hardest hit i.e., retail and tourism, account for 23 percent of the labor force [Appendix
4]. 59
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The report stated that although the overall long-term impacts of the crisis are
uncertain, resolving the political crisis is not only essential for the society’s well-being
and cohesion, but also crucial for reaching economic growth targets and sustainability
goals. Additionally, the constraints that have limited potential economic growth in the
past will undoubtedly remain, and most likely be magnified by escalations in political
insecurity.
The report concluded that a solution to Thailand’s political conflict must be
implemented. A perpetuating conflict will not only lead to the breakdown of confidence
in foreign investors, but will also negatively affect human welfare. Subsequently, the
income of many Thais will decline through job losses, shifts to lower wage jobs, or
reduced work hours. This could lead to serious political consequences. Since the majority
of the population remains without social protection, and past ad hoc attempts to provide
social safety nets were not wholly successful—the already combustible situation would
be aggravated further and popular support of the current government would
correspondingly decrease.
The Sources of Thailand’s Inequality and Poverty
Political Inequality
It does not take elaborate social theories to see something that is quite basic. In
democracies, people participate in politics because they have something to gain. This is
especially applicable to rural Thais [Appendix 5]. Accordingly, the Northeast and North
scored highest on UNDP’s political and social participation indexes; while Bangkok and
neighboring provinces ranked bottom. 60
60
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Struggling to make a living, these people have few connections and no financial
resources, and therefore few opportunities to influence government policy. Their citizens’
strategy toolbox consists of two basic tools: election votes and street protests. In case
their voting rights are effectively revoked, through government corruption and military
meddling, such people are left virtually helpless. Feeling choked, instigators use street
protests as a last resort to create public unrest and then choose to utilize this as leverage
against a perceivably unresponsive government.
Hence, it is easy to see the source of anger when we re-examine the Thai
situation. In office, Thaksin advocated populist policies and implemented social welfare
schemes directed at the poor, i.e., the universal health care scheme and one million baht
per village. Suddenly ousting a prime minister, popular among the poor and less
privileged—the majority of the population in Thailand’s case—, is hardly a recipe for
social cohesion.
Both the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions promised all Thais a right to participate in a
democratic government; however, the system for political engagement has since fractured
or else never been truly invoked. Although political party affiliation depends on many
factors, in the case of Thailand, there is a clear regional and social divide between red
shirts and yellow shirts. The yellow shirts, Thaksin’s critics, are concentrated in Bangkok
and the surrounding area; the most affluent and urbanized region of the nation. The red
shirts, Thaksin’s supporters, are from the northeast and upper northern regions. “They
present themselves as rural and poor, as opposed to the urban elites who are closer to the
revered King Bhumibol and his family.” 61 As general rule, political alliance and
61
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influence is determined by regional lines, which consequently match socioeconomic
distributions [Appendix 6]. This coincidence is hard to overlook and leads to the question
of national equity and distribution of wealth.
Rapid Growth and Increases in Inequality
Inequity problem have been hard to pinpoint, since overall economic gains mask
the serious disparities existing between and within Asian countries. Consequentially,
these inequalities can be traced to various dimensions of unevenness in the economies’
growth process. In a 2007 Asian Development Review, the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) assessed that, over the last decade, developing Asia’s rapid growth rates
contributed to a remarkable decline in the incidence of poverty, yet have also been
marked by rising income and expenditure inequalities. 62 Using the Gini coefficient, a
standard measure of relative inequality, the ADB measured inequality in expenditure and
income distributions of all ADB developing member countries. Seven countries had
coefficients of 40 or more, three of which were in South East Asia, including Thailand
[Appendix 7].63,64
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Over a span of 40 years, inequality in Thailand has become worse; even when
compared to other South East Asian nations the contrast is striking [see Appendix 11]. 65
Additionally, social welfare spending as a percentage of GDP in Thailand has been
consistently lower than in other East Asian countries. 66 A number of neighboring nations
were able to dampen the effects of rising levels of inequality by implementing initiatives
to reduce poverty, e.g., South Korean and Taiwanese land reforms in the late 1940s. 67 On
the other hand, the success rates of such policies varied by country.
Economic growth in high Gini coefficient Asian countries has been identified to
be uneven across several dimensions: geographic sub-national locations (e.g., provinces,
regions, or states); urban and rural sectors; and socioeconomic groups (e.g., education
levels and sector work). 68 Thailand clearly follows this relationship. In 2004, 17 percent
of Thailand’s population lived in the Bangkok area, yet Bangkokians accounted for 44
percent of the total GDP. 69 The remaining Central region had 17 percent of the
population and 27 percent of GDP. 70 The South accounted for 14 percent of the
population, while sharing 9 percent of national GDP; meanwhile the mountainous North
had 18 percent of the population and only 9 percent of GDP. 71
Thailand’s agrarian regions showed the clearest disadvantage. Historically, the
Northeast has always been one of Thailand’s poorest areas. Not only because of its
unfavorable natural resource endowments i.e., low rainfall and poor soil, but also due to a
lack of investment in productive and human capital. Therefore, it should not come as a
65
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surprise that although the Isan region had the largest portion of the population in 2004 at
34 percent, but enjoyed a mere 11 percent share of national output. 72
In the quest to make Thailand part of the global economy, policymakers focused
government spending on industry while neglecting agriculture. The unevenness in growth
arose from biased policies, which favored certain groups and regions over others. In the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s industrial promotion through trade protection and foreign
investment allocated capital into manufacturing, banking, finance, insurance and real
estate. These policies developed urban sectors at the expense of rural agriculture, largely
restricting benefits to Bangkok and its vicinity.
Consequentially, wage gaps between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors
increased, while income levels between rural and urban populations also diverged.
Consequently, impacts of past policies are still present. As of 2009, the average wage of
a female working in the non-agricultural sector (9,596 baht per month) was 3 times
higher than a female worker in the agricultural sector (3,163.6 baht per month). 73
In the past, temporary improvements in income distributions have been associated
with favorable agricultural prices, suggesting that policies that enhance rural incomes
could also improve the overall equity. 74 Deficiencies in public investments in agriculture
and the rural economy overall, has been problematic precisely because the productivity of
agriculture determines the standards of living for many people in Asia. 75 Less than fifty
years ago, an overwhelming 82 percent of the Thai population worked in agriculture
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compared to the current 42 percent. 76 The share of GDP of the agricultural sector sharply
declined from nearly 40 percent in 1960 to approximately 11 percent in the mid-1990s. 77
The employment rate in the agricultural declined less sharply. The largest proportion of
the labor force is still employed in this sector, but enjoys proportionately less income
than before. This effect has left more Thai people disadvantaged in the rural, rather than
urban areas.
Rises in Existing Income Disparities
A clear wage bias existed—and will always exist—in favor of skill; adoption of
new technologies as well as foreign direct investments demand a more-skilled labor
force. This is especially true with Thailand’s transition into a more service-based
industry. However, this further contributes to income inequalities. Due to rapid economic
growth, the demand for skilled workers has increased more rapidly than the demand for
unskilled workers, resulting in faster growth of wages among the skilled. 78 In other
words, Thailand’s development increases wages among the group of workers who would
have received better wages regardless of economic growth levels. This facilitates rises in
existing income disparities.
In addition, past education policy has prioritized tertiary above secondary and
primary education, helping the educated become even more educated. In 1986, 1990, and
1994, households with incomes below the poverty line received very low shares (14–23
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percent) of the direct benefits of government education expenditure, compared to shares
received by households above the poverty line (75–86 percent). 79
Uneven access to education contributed to regional inequality. It partially explains
why the average 2010 income of Bangkokians was 13 times that of Isan people,
compared to only five times higher in 1987. 80 Unfortunately, even the most recent
subsidies help the rich, while not helping the poor enough; resulting in a failure to breach
the achievement gap between children of different socioeconomic backgrounds.
Perceived Inequality
Having their seeds sown in the 1970s, changes in Thai lifestyle, architecture, and
behavior have became more visible in the early 1990s and onward. A new class of
nouveaux riches has become socially identifiable. 81 It is this cosmopolitan modernity
that Thailand’s film industry is presenting to its rural populations when it portrays the
modern homes and lifestyles of urban professionals living in Bangkok. 82 Many people
strive to imitate the lifestyles they see on television. Yet to the lower classes, most of
glamorized status symbols, such as eating at sushi restaurants, are financially
inaccessible. Financial barriers serve as social exclusion instruments and fuel resentment,
threatening Thailand’s traditionally community-oriented culture, to which many rural
populations still closely adhere.
Although unfair distribution in health, education, public policy participation, and
economic assets such as land are undoubtedly serious forms of inequity, the obvious
differences in lifestyles are a more embittering form of inequality. Popular media provide
79
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windows into the lives of privileged Bangkokians. It offers rural Thais an opportunity to
compare their lives to that of the urban elite—this awareness contributes to a rise
perceived inequality.
In an atmosphere where ostentation is not discouraged, the yawning gap between
rich and poor is most openly displayed in Bangkok. There ostentatious displays of wealth
are commonplace alongside the crushing poverty experienced by millions of workers
who migrated from the countryside. 83
The perceived arrogance of Thailand's rich towards the poor is well documented.
In 2008, a traffic incident in Bangkok led to a direct confrontation between Thailand’s
rich and poor; and managed to shine a spotlight on the nation’s class conflict. 84 During a
heated argument with a bus operator, the enraged driver of a Mercedes Benz accelerated
into a crowd of awaiting bus passengers, killing one. Blaming the incident on mental
stress, the Mercedes Benz driver was released on bail and allowed to keep his license.
Although the public was outraged, there was little anyone could do since the luxury car
owner was the son of a wealthy businessman and the nephew of a powerful police officer.
The victim’s daughter was quoted saying, “Many parts of the Thai bureaucratic
system favor rich people—if you are not one of them, you will always be left at the back
of the queue.” 85 Unfortunately, such unfair treatment of the poor has become a social
norm; ostensibly impoverished Thais hold little value in the eyes of the government.
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What Lies Ahead
Besides open class conflict, the persistence of inequality, can lead to other
unfavorable outcomes. First, high levels of inequality lead to pressures to redistribute in
ways that may disturb public peace. While the persistence of inequalities reinforces the
capture of political, economic, and legal institutions by a minority elite who secure
benefits of public policy, investment, and services in favor of themselves. Such actions
cause political inequality which only aggravates the initial imbalanced distribution of
opportunity and endowment. 86 Ultimately, the call for redistribution and sharing political
power can range from peaceful and prolonged street demonstrations to a violent civil war.
It is in this current stage that Thailand has found itself—its future undetermined as of yet.
Politicians now recognize that in order to resolve Thailand’s civil unrest, social
welfare must become a national priority. To address grievances in Thai society, Prime
Minister Vejjajiva declared five main objectives for reconciliation efforts [Appendix 1]: 87
1) To uphold the monarchy.
2) To resolve fundamental problems of social injustice by undertaking
systematic and structural reformation of the Thai welfare state
3) To enable the media’s free and constructive operation.
4) To investigate the violent incidents which occurred since the demonstrations
began in March.
5) To establish mutually acceptable political rules by setting up a mechanism
that solicits views from all members of society.

In accordance with the second point, which addresses problems of social and
economic injustice at the national level, Prime Minister Vejjajiva recently announced that
Thailand will aim to be a welfare state by 2017. However, the Truth and Reconciliation
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Committee, responsible for designing resolution measures, has been unsuccessful so far,
failing to provide measures that satisfy all involved parties. 88
Window of Opportunity: Current Advantages of Implementing Cash Transfers
Social Welfare Aids Future Economic Growth
At present, the Strategic Plan for the Promotion of Social Welfare in Thailand
(2007-11) has no explicit reference to cash transfers used as means of increasing
children’s education, health, and nutrition levels. 89 Although the country’s recent civil
unrest has brought much discord to Thailand, it has also created a window of opportunity
for initiating social welfare programs. These circumstances are especially advantageous
for implementing CCTs as an instrument of reconciliation.
CCT programs are beneficial for government and public alike; such programs
would immediately alleviate poverty by raising the consumption floor of poor
households, while also cultivating popular support for governing bodies. This would
reduce conflict and disruption brought about by public opposition, ultimately promoting
support for other policy reforms. In the long-term, these social welfare schemes would
reduce inequity through advances in socioeconomic mobility, while a focus on children’s
well-being and education will provide substantial investment returns to the national
economy in the future.
Improvements in education, and other forms of human capital investment, have
been identified as key in optimizing the nation’s economic potential. As education
becomes more broadly based and equally accessible to all, people with low incomes are
88
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better able to seek out economic opportunities. 90 According to new growth theories the
accumulation of human capital via education facilitates economic growth by increasing
labor productivity as well as promoting technological innovation and adaptation. 91 In
support, cross-country empirical studies found primary and secondary school enrollment
rates positively correlated to economic growth and investment; in addition these studies
established a negative link between education and fertility rates. 92
Thailand has tailored its preferred economic growth strategy accordingly. This
was demonstrated at the Sustainable Growth, Regional Balance and Social Development
for Poverty Reduction in Thailand 2006 Seminar. This seminar was attended by the
World Bank, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), the
Ministries of Finance, Education, Social Development and Human Security,
Environment, as well as representatives from private sectors, universities, and research
institutes. At this seminar, experts agreed that the nation must focus on increasing human
capital in order to ensure economic growth and prosperity in the coming years.
Thailand is now at a point of development in which the past approach to promote
economic growth, namely infusing capital without developing higher labor skills, will not
suffice [Appendix 12]. 93 The country’s future growth will depend on its ability to
strengthen skills and education of the workforce. This matter is urgent for the nation to
become a more efficient knowledge-based economy; considering that 58.2 percent of the
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current labor force has an elementary level education or lower, much progress remains to
be made [Appendix 13].94
The poor quality of education and the shortages of industrial skills are problems
that Thailand must tackle forcefully if it is to evolve into a knowledge economy on par
with other leading East Asian economies. 95
Using the Reform Wave as an Advantage
In recent years, Thailand’s government has identified improvements in education,
and other forms human capital investment, as key in optimizing the economy’s overall
growth potential. Since CCTs are social welfare schemes that focus on poverty
alleviation as well as human capital investment, they can improve overall national
economic growth potential. Such social safety nets will gain political support and
financial backing more readily than traditional forms of poverty relief. Also the fact that
beneficiaries of CCTs are primarily young children can perhaps reduce the reluctance of
the non-poor to contribute to social-welfare programs.
In support of CCT programs, recent surveys among the general public indicate
that people prefer the government to take more responsibility for social welfare
programs. 96 According to a survey conducted by Thailand Development Research
Institute (TDRI) in May 2010, the six benefits most wanted by Thais are more education
subsidies, free or low medical bills, vocational training assistance, pension plans,
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unemployment assistance and increased funding for the underprivileged. 97 However, the
report also uncovered a general distrust of the government’s ability to distribute benefits
fairly. Especially worrisome is the biased poverty targeting at the village level. Village
heads often allocate medical cards and other benefits according to their own criteria,
prioritizing access to government aid for close relatives and friends.
As a solution, CCTs reduce corruption risks by establishing direct links between
poor families and government aid; making social welfare more discreet and direct as well
as independent of village authority. Having families handle program transfers on
individual bases would also defuse some possible conflicts between beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries within Thailand’s close-knit village communities. One potential design
could include provisions for privacy by which the amount each family receives would be
private information, thereby eliminating arguments over benefit distribution. Overall,
CCTs would enhance the efficiency of the social welfare mechanism in Thailand; with it
improving the confidence in social safety nets as well as generating the willingness to
fund them.
Conveniently, CCT programs also avoid the mistake of breeding dependence on
the state and can potentially lift morale among the disadvantaged. In contrast to past
policies, eligible beneficiaries in CCT programs enter into a form of social contract with
the Thai government. A household’s cash transfers are directly linked to their choice of
whether or not to proactively follow CCT rules. This form of social welfare scheme
prohibits apathetic households from receiving cash transfers and avoids the problem of
97
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passive state dependence. Essentially, program benefits could cease after the household’s
school-age children reached adulthood. For example, in neighboring Indonesia, the
maximum duration of a family’s dependence was found to be an average of 6 years.

98,99

Additionally, such social welfare designs allow the poor to not only contribute to
society, but become an integral part of building the nation’s future. Parents forgo having
children work on the farm, and instead choose to assist the state in developing the next
generation into an educated and more productive workforce.
CCTs also allow Thailand to progress in its observance of universal human rights,
especially emphasizing the importance of non-selectivity in accepting norms. The
nation’s commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights during a 1993
regional meeting for the World Conference demonstrated its desire to promote such
principles. CCT effectively allow Thailand to actively abide to Articles 25 and 26, which
state the right to adequate living and the right to education [Appendix 14]. 100
Additionally, a Thai CCT program will better align the nation with the United
Nation’s Millennium Development Goals that it has agreed to achieve by 2015
[Appendix 15]. The goals include eradicating poverty and hunger, achieving universal
education, and reducing malnutrition, among others. 101
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Resolving Current Social Welfare Flaws
The Thai government now recognizes that its services and expenditures targeted
to the poorest households are weak. In this window of opportunity it is important to
utilize the current momentum of policy reform and wave of social welfare expansion.
Acting quickly to design country appropriate CCTs is likely to increase collaboration
between Thailand’s other social welfare programs [Appendix 16].
Also CCTs have the unique ability to resolve pitfalls of existing social welfare
programs in Thailand, such as its free public schooling program. Despite having made
graduation from secondary school mandatory by law, a large participation drop
(approximately 30 percent) occurs immediately before admission into upper secondary
education, i.e., 10th grade [Appendix 17]. 102 Although this government welfare ostensibly
provides 15 years of free education in public schools, the funds do not subsidize, and
therefore motivate, poor households enough to encourage upper levels of education
attainment.
This trend can be partially explained by additional costs incurred to families with
school-age children. Transportation costs to secondary schools, which are usually fewer,
than primary schools and therefore located farther from villages, are too high for many
impoverished households. Books are only provided free of cost if they are returned in
good condition at the end of each school year; and although the government pays for one
school uniform per child per year, families are responsible for providing all additional
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school uniforms. 103 Lastly, no barriers exist for more well-off families from receiving the
benefits just mentioned. This aspect makes the current free schooling program less costefficient. In contrast, CCTs are administered only to families with children meeting
certain criteria. Barriers to aid access are built-in; increasing cost-effectiveness and
accelerating achievement gap narrowing between children of all socioeconomic
backgrounds.
Stopping the Deterioration in Childhood Development
Thailand will also find CCT programs particularly favorable due to their focus on
childhood development. A growing trend in the North and Northeast is family
breakdown. 104 This is a major factor that inhibits childhood development in Thailand’s
low-income families. As parents move from farm to city in search of higher wages,
grandparents are left in rural villages to care for their grandchildren. However, for the
learning process, particularly intellectual aspects, the grandparents cannot support the
children as well as parents can. A 2009 study by Mahidol University found that preschool and school-aged children with parents as the major caregivers received better
general health care and promotion of emotional, social, and intellectual development,
while children with grandparents as their primary caregivers were twice as likely to suffer
from delayed development. 105
A TDRI panel declared that absentee parents, gaps in economic conditions, and
educational opportunities hinder the development of Thai democracy, and directly
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contribute to Thailand’s current political conflict. 106 Public support for childhood
development is an essential precursor to maximizing benefits attained from education;
since a healthy childhood leads to healthy, skilled adulthood, which in turn creates a
healthy and productive society. 107
CCTs as Buffers to Economic Volatility
Further contributing to their efficiency potential, CCTs successfully hedge against
unforeseen hazards while also eliminating demand for event-specific coping mechanisms.
The risk management potentials are seen on household and national levels alike. First, the
supplementary income serves as informal insurance against unexpected family
emergencies such as unemployment and illness. Second, cash transfers reduce large-scale
civilian vulnerability to global market shocks e.g., fuel or food price rises. In essence,
providing protection against drastic consumption declines to members at the bottom of
the ‘market chain’. Since Thailand’s economy is especially susceptible to outside shocks,
CCTs can play an important role in minimizing financial vulnerability in times of
economic volatility. This will avoid the increase in poverty incidents documented with
past economic crises.
Thais have little to no culture of saving; the negative effects of this are most
destabilizing in low income families. By creating an income buffer, a Thai CCT program
would ease beneficiaries’ vulnerability when their household income levels suddenly
drop. CCTs also encourage greater self-reliance through savings of monthly cash
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transfers, instead of relying on erratic government schemes during periods of national
economic downturn.
CCTs may also provide some added benefit in ways of decreasing illegal activity
and child labor. During times of increased economic stress, unemployed youth would be
less likely to support household income by engaging in drug trafficking and prostitution;
while parents would be less inclined to have their school-age children work. 108
Gender Equality and CCT Mechanisms
Most CCT programs transfer cash allotments to the mother of the household,
under the premise that it will be spent on the welfare of the family. Typically, a mother’s
objectives are more closely aligned to those of her children. 109 In support, a study
associated with Thammasat University found that female headed households in Thailand
are generally better off than those headed by males. This suggests that women are more
resourceful than men in handling household income. 110
A combination of culture as well as promotion of gender equality from the early
stages of development has allowed the status of women in Thailand to be relatively equal
to that of men. 111 Both sexes enjoy equal schooling and participation in the labor market.
Furthermore, Thai women enjoy a great deal of autonomy in decision making and
managing of household budget. 112 Considering preexisting norms, Thai women will
easily manage cash transfer allotment.
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Compared to other developing countries, Thailand allows a great deal of freedom
to its women. Nonetheless, the nation stands to make further improvements in female
empowerment. At present, women and children remain the main victims of violence as
well as poverty. Shockingly, a 2004 UNDP study reported that nearly half of the Thai
female population has been victim of sexual or physical violence inflicted upon them by
their domestic partner. 113 Additionally, prostitution and child trafficking remain
prominent features in Thai society due to a thriving sex tourism industry. Under
circumstances of domestic abuse and poverty, additional money from CCTs could
undoubtedly secure a better future for Thailand’s women as well as children.
Applying Lessons from Past CCT Programs
The overall advantage of hindsight can be a practical guiding tool in developing a
Thai CCT program appropriate in size and scope. The availability of assessment literature
on foreign programs will undoubtedly expedite Thailand’s own design process. Utilizing
pros and cons of past CCT programs will help Thailand avoid common implementation
mistakes. CCT programs conducted in neighboring nations, i.e., Indonesia, Cambodia,
and the Philippines, can offer useful insight into design and practice.
For example, lessons from Cambodia’s Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR)
can be used to address Thailand’s 30 percent school enrolment drop after lower
secondary education. 114 JFPR encouraged Cambodian girls to continue into lowersecondary school after completing elementary level education; evidence suggests that the
program had an approximate 31 percentage point impact. 115 The Cambodia Education
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Sector Support Program (CESSP), a follow-up program targeting both boys and girls,
proved nearly as successful with a 21 percentage point affect. 116
Additionally, governments utilize feedback from domestic CCT experimentation.
Through their design, pilot programs are used to address country specific challenges. In
addition, small scale initiatives allow officials and social services to familiarize
themselves with CCT mechanisms, effectively smoothing possible administrative kinks.
Results are later analyzed and integrated into a larger social safety net development. The
Brazilian government created a widely supported national program, Bolsa Familia, from
aggregating lessons of smaller domestic initiatives. 117
Benefits of Creating CCTs in Middle-Income Nations
CCT sophistication largely depends on administration capacity. The most
successful as well as advanced programs are currently found in middle-income Latin
American countries. South American CCTs rely on effective administration via
computerization and identity cards. In Brazil’s Bolsa Familia as well as Mexico’s
Oportunidades program, computerized registries have improved targeting accuracy,
allowing programs to be better than any previous social spending scheme in reaching the
people they are intended to reach. 118 For example, Bolsa Familia screens out nonqualifying beneficiaries by checking beneficiary information against data on formalsector employees. While improving cost-effectiveness of social welfare spending, these
practices also eliminate the reliance on community-led implementation and monitoring
that many lower income CCT nations depend on.
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Thailand’s own status as a middle-income nation means it can utilize similar
computerized mechanisms of currently successful CCT programs. In addition, Thailand
is sufficiently developed to absorb the future rise in demand for social services that will
likely occur with a successfully implemented CCT program. To meet growing demand,
the country could expand services more efficiently than its less developed, lower-income
counterparts could.
Potential Obstacles and Strategic Solutions: Designing with Foresight
Quality and Distribution of Social Services: Strengthening Desirable Outcomes
As previously discussed, Thailand has significant regional differences in poverty
levels. The frequency of poverty is most pronounced in the northern, southern, and northeastern provinces. For example, the southern province of Narathiwat had 34 percent of its
population living below poverty in 2002, compared to the national average of 9.8
percent. 119
Similarly, economic regional disparities exist for education and health indicators.
According to the UNDP, Thais living in the North and Northeast suffer from
disproportionate rates of underweight birth, disability, chronic health problems, AIDS,
mental illness as well as the smallest ratio of physicians per capita [Appendix 18]. 120
Regional education levels are equally skewed. People from the Northeast, in addition to
several northern and southern provinces, rank lowest in mean years of schooling,
enrollment rates, test scores, and other indicators [Appendix 19].121
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CCTs are not a panacea to all social ills; programs are largely effective, but
challenges to goal accomplishment exist. Strong evidence from other programs shows
that CCTs encourage poor households to make better use of health and education
services. On the other hand, some controversy exists over the magnitude of improvement
that CCTs alone can provide. By and large, the health and education impacts on
beneficiaries can only be as good as the quality of social services that are provided.
Foremost, in order to strengthen the impacts of cash transfers on Thailand’s
overall human capital, the government must address the existing regional disparities in
qualities of public services. This could be accomplished by promoting greater supply as
well as quality control of health facilities and schools in rural regions. Otherwise, the
cash incentives responsible for promoting poverty reduction and human capital growth
are rendered ineffective.
Quality and Distribution of Social Services: A Need for Improvement
Supply-side progress must be made to address regional disparities in Thailand’s
education and health service sectors. The most qualified professionals work in the
Bangkok metropolis, while other areas of the country are badly in need of them. For
example, there is one physician to every 850 people in Bangkok, compared to one for
every 14,159 people in the northeastern province of Loei. 122
The poor quality of services in rural areas is perhaps most apparent in the
education system. The NESB determined that 60 percent of Thai teachers underperform,
especially those who work in poor rural schools. 123 Rural teachers are often inadequate
for a number of reasons. Although a large factor is that teachers themselves are often not
122
123

Somchai and Son, 41.
Ibid., 14.

39

the best students; more incentives exist for Thailand’s brightest minds to become
businessmen, lawyers, and government officials. Furthermore, many rural schools are
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior instead of the Ministry of Education. 124
This association cuts rural teachers’ access to certain scholarships and other benefits,
making rural employment especially unfavorable. 125
Another disincentive against working in rural communities involves a somewhat
mandatory adherence to traditional Thai culture. In rural villages, teachers are given a
special social status that is generally accompanied by a plunge into debt. In accordance
with culture and tradition, teachers are expected to dress nicely, drive cars, as well as
contribute large sums of money for family emergencies and community events. In order
to adhere to a major cornerstone of Thai culture, many teachers are willing to incur large
loans rather than “lose face.”
Nonetheless, a mediocre education is better than no education. The National
Education Act stipulates that all persons have equal rights to receive 12 years of free
schooling. However, only nine years are compulsory and parents are primarily
responsible to enforce the law. Unfortunately, school attendance monitoring is often
ineffective in poor households, since parents are away working most of the day. Reasons
for children skipping school are numerous, and can be attributed to gang activity,
gambling, drugs, etc. Admittedly, some children choose to forgo education for hopes of
earning income to support their families. This is especially true among large families with
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high dependency ratios i.e., households with larger numbers of children, old people, or
disabled persons, compared to national averages. 126
Although free tuition and uniforms do promote prolonged education, the
unaccounted costs of transportation are often too great and the benefits too small,
especially after the required nine years of schooling. This attitude is reinforced by
established community-norms; children from poor backgrounds may not comprehend the
long-term benefits of seeking an education above that of their elders. Subsequently, this
behavior is translated into the one-third percentage drop in participation after lower
secondary [Appendix 13].
Quality and Distribution of Social Services: Recommendations
CCTs directed towards education, require children attend 80–85 percent of all
school days. 127 This would provide additional incentives for parents to monitor school
attendance; evaluations show that CCTs increased school enrollment in virtually every
program. For example, Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social (RPS) increased school
enrollment by 13 percentage points among children aged 7–13; leading to substantial
reductions in child labor. 128
In Thailand’s context, CCTs could be targeted to increase attendance rollover
between lower and upper secondary schools. This has been done before in Mexico for
children making the transition from primary to secondary school. 129 It is also important to
note that school enrollment, in Oportunidades communities, also increased among
126
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ineligible children. This phenomenon was largely attributed to the spillover effect;
children from barely ineligible households were more likely to attend school, because
their eligible peers were required by the program to attend regularly. 130
Unfortunately, getting more children to attend school heavily depends on the
quality of education offered. 131 In this aspect, some current education issues must be
addressed. For one, incentives must be improved for highly capable individuals to
become teachers. An increase in education budget and a subsequent rise in teaching
salaries could provide enough incentive. At present, Thailand spends less than most
lower-middle income nations on education. As a consequence, its average education
levels need 28.7 years for convergence with those of currently industrialized nations,
while those of neighboring Philippines and Indonesia require 10.6 and 20.7 years
respectively [Appendix 20]. 132
In the past, Thailand has put considerable effort towards improving secondary
education; however, evidence suggests earlier interventions targeted towards
disadvantaged children may have higher returns than later interventions. 133 At age three,
disadvantaged children may test only modestly behind national averages. However, by
age six, children entering elementary school may be limited by inadequate levels of
cognitive, social, and emotional development received in early childhood [Appendix
21]. 134

130

Ibid.
Ibid.
132
Son, 9.
133
James J. Heckman,“Skill Formation and the Economics of Investing in Disadvantaged Children.” Science 312,
no.5782 (2006).
134
Fiszbein and others, 25.
131

42

It would be worthwhile to consider a Thai CCT program aimed towards
increasing kindergarten enrollment. At present, pre-education attendance is a quarter
below that of elementary education [Appendix 22]. Foremost, increased enrollment in
pre-school programs would improve basic development among young children. Those
most vulnerable to delayed development i.e., children with grandparents as primary
caregivers, would benefit substantially. Such programs would also be attractive in their
cost-efficiency; generally speaking, kindergarten education is less burdensome to finance
than secondary education, while the return in investments may be greater.
Lastly, inputs in early education could enhance the formation of healthy livelong
habits. In recent years, hospitals admissions for hypertension, heart disease, diabetes, and
cancer have sharply increased [Appendix 23].135 The increase in such problems is largely
driven by an unhealthy lifestyle i.e., more stress, insufficient exercise, unbalanced diet,
and smoking and drinking habits. 136 Against the background of rising health costs,
preventative health care has recently gained greater importance. 137
This could reduce potential future health care costs by structuring lesson plans
around promoting a healthy lifestyle, including the benefits of exercise and proper
nutrition as well as the dangers of smoking and drinking. This would especially benefit
the poorest regions of the country, the Northeast, in which unhealthy habits are especially
prevalent [Appendix 24].
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The Present State of Social Service Funding: Taking Care of Tax Payers
The Universal Health Care (UHC) system was developed between 2001 and 2002.
Five years later over 95 percent of the population had some form of health coverage; in
2006, over 70 percent of hospital visits fell under the UHC gold card scheme,
administered by the National Health Security Office (NHSO). 138 The impact of the health
care reform provided informal sector workers, and their families, with free
comprehensive health coverage.
Although the scheme is widely used and extremely popular, some policy issues do
exist. For one, no effective barrier exists for middle and upper class citizens from
accessing benefits. Temporarily unemployed formal sector employees can use the free
health coverage for procedures not covered by the Social Security Fund (SSF). 139 Formal
sector employees are enrolled into the SSF plan and automatically excluded from NHSO
health coverage. Therefore, the resources available to low-income families are stretched
thin.
The universal healthcare scheme only delivers health services, whereas SSF
provides a package of social services to formal sector employees, including maternity
leave, child support, and old-age pension as well as assistance during injury, illness,
unemployment, and disability. 140 However, compared to NHSO dependants, SSF
beneficiaries receive a smaller fraction of overall health care funds. Annually, public
spending allocates 2,217 baht per person under the NHSO’s scheme, while spending
138
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1,861 baht per person covered by SSF. 141 Under the current system, taxpayers are
perceivably receiving fewer health care benefits while fielding the insurance bill of 48
million strangers. 142
This has two implications for CCTs. First, it inhibits taxpayer approval of health
care services that the CCT initiative would require the poor to use. Second, it shows that
the Thai government must use taxes more efficiently within existing social welfare
programs.
The Present State of Social Service Funding: A Need for Efficiency
The feelings of reverse discrimination, currently brewing among the taxpayer
population, must be ameliorated by guaranteeing equal per person public spending under
SSF and NHSO coverage. This can be done if the government stopped diverting funds
from civil service and social security schemes as a means to offset rising NHSO
expenditure. 143
Universal health care schemes are inherently expensive ventures. At present,
Thailand is one of the only lower-middle income countries to have adopted a
comprehensive UHC. Most programs are implemented in far more wealthy and
developed European countries. The financial burdens of those UHC programs are not
overwhelming to those governments since most utilize high income taxes for employees.
The generated revenue allows governments to invest back into the system.
On the other hand, the majority of Thailand’s population works in the informal
sector and pays no income tax. To ensure UHC’s survival in today’s hostile economic
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climate, the Thai government must operate the program more efficiently. In recent years,
Thailand’s Public Health Ministry has increasingly become resource constrained. The
2008 global financial crisis led to a 3 percent decrease in government budget; by 2010, it
ran 4.10 percent of the GDP as deficit. 144 This economic downturn also contributed to a
sharp increase in unemployment and a subsequent rise in free healthcare prescribers. In
March 2009, it was reported that 50,000 people per month were turning to free UHC
coverage as a result of the economic crisis. 145
The increase in free healthcare users as well as a decrease in tax revenues was
unfortunately timed. In 2007, the 30 baht per visit co-pay for gold card holders was
abolished, dramatically reducing private expenditure for health services. 146 In late 2010,
280 state hospitals were experiencing financial problems as a result. To cover the rising
costs of providing free universal healthcare, the Public Ministry of Health diverted funds
away from formal sector insurance. As previously discussed, this led to a reduction in the
annual baht-per-person expenditure for those covered by the SSF.
The increase in workload for doctors contributed to a migration of many
physicians from the public health sector to the higher-paying private sector. 147 This fuels
an ongoing competition between Thailand’s public and private hospitals for attracting the
best employees among the nation’s limited supply of qualified physicians. 148
Despite high costs, the UHC is a necessary social welfare program in a nation that
by and large provides no other social support to the majority of the population. The
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importance of Thailand’s UHC has been recognized by red shirts and yellow shirts
alike. 149
A CCT initiative would provide much needed pressure to raise entry barriers
within existing social welfare programs. For example, the universal healthcare scheme
can become more cost-effective if underlying issues, such as free-rider problems, are
adequately addressed. Admittedly, amending universal healthcare coverage might fuel
dissatisfaction from the poor; however, if administered in tandem with a national CCT
program, its backlash would be significantly less severe. A dual action plan would show
that the government is not reducing the amount of support provided to low-income
families, but is concerned about increasing UHC’s cost-effectiveness. This policy would
also signal to taxpayers that the government is becoming more careful with public
expenditure.
The Present State of Social Service Funding: Recommendations
A few hospitals among the many that were experiencing monetary constraints in
late 2010, reportedly diverted hospital budgets to support community hospitals that were
providing services to free healthcare dependants. 150 Especially in rural regions of the
Thailand, community hospitals or clinics are more accessible than provincial hospitals.
The cost of transportation as well as long hospital lines often deter impoverished Thais
from seeking medical care in state hospitals.
This is the case for Kambon Noi villagers, who live in a landfill community
located on the outskirts of Khon Kaen. Kambon Noi’s nearest health center is a private
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clinic about 3–5 km from the village. 151 Unless a situation is fairly serious, most landfill
dwellers take out a 200 baht community loan to seek private healthcare care nearby; later
repaying the money by working additional hours if such opportunities are available. 152
Although all community members have gold cards, which entitle them to free
health services at public hospitals, the Khon Kaen municipal hospital is located much
farther from the village, approximately 17 km away. The cost of transportation and food
alone can add up to nearly 300 baht in expenses; in addition to the opportunity costs of a
lost workday. 153 Strangely, for Khambon Noi scavengers, accessing nearby private care is
almost 100 baht cheaper than seeking free health services in the city. Also they avoid
waiting long hours outside the hospital with hundreds of other patients.
It is not surprising that directors of some provincial hospitals have diverted their
own funds to smaller community hospitals. These health centers are usually more
accessible to majority of the rural poor. Unfortunately, Khambon Noi does not have a
public community center nearby; villagers are willing to pay a premium for gaining
access to nearby physicians.
Ammar Siamwalla, an economist on NHSO’s finance and treasury subcommittee,
suggests that financial problems can be solved by adopting a co-payment policy for
patients under the civil service scheme, rather than re-instating the previous 30 baht fee
of free health care beneficiaries. 154 However, the civil service scheme covers a fraction of
the people that the universal health care scheme covers. 155
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Khambon Noi’s example demonstrates that poor Thais are willing to pay much
more than the once mandatory 30 baht co-payment to gain access to convenient health
care, and that transportation costs to state hospitals too often exceed the out-of-pocket
payments for receiving private medical service nearby.
Therefore, a better solution to UHC’s financial problems would be to encourage
voluntary donations from gold card members with a suggested amount of 30 baht per
visit. This would bring at least some revenue to UHC on a volunteer basis. The resources
could then be channeled into improving the quality and number of community hospitals
available in rural areas.
Recently, government health officials decided to add renal replacement therapy
and antiretroviral therapy treatment to UHC’s extensive list of free procedures. 156 By
some estimates these items alone will account for 31.2 percent of health expenditure by
2020. 157 Soliciting voluntary donations may be somewhat unpopular. However, it is a
reasonable price to pay for alleviating the heavy strain the UHC is currently under. This
is especially true considering that a substantial number of current UHC beneficiaries are
not living below poverty lines.
CCTs would be effective mechanisms in making this potential solution a reality.
Cash transfers provide additional household income that could be used to invest back into
the state healthcare system. Ideally, people would begin to contribute some money
toward government initiatives for improving community hospital abundance.
In the long-run, this would cut transportation costs and waiting time among the
rural poor; also reduce the dependence on more expensive nearby private clinics many
156
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low-income families face. Likewise, a portion of the generated funds could be allocated
for improvements in existing facilities through new medicine and medical equipment
purchases as well as skill training programs.
Pilot Programs
Crucial First Steps to Reconciliation
On April 10th, 2010, red shirts rallied in Bangkok again, once more seeking
justice for the unexplained civilian deaths during last year’s violent government
crackdown. The yellow shirts have been holding protests of a different kind, pressuring
the government to appoint a new administration rather than adhering to the current plan
of holding national elections in June. In response, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva
suggested postponing reelections until July. 158 In light of such events, the International
Crisis Group (ICG) released a grim report on Thailand’s political climate, urging the
government to consider international third party reelection monitoring.
In a hostile environment, mistakes become more costly. The government cannot
afford to engage a deeply fractured society in more political intrigue. The importance of
holding free and fair elections is now amplified by domestic as well as international
pressure. 159 A fair election race is crucial for gaining a proper national mandate to pursue
genuine political reconciliation. 160
The recipe for a fair victory is not complicated. The winner is likely to draw from
a majority vote of the poor. In recent years, political participation has increased
remarkably in rural regions. Overall improvements in political awareness, political
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participation, and voting rates have been attributed to a strengthening in community
organizations. 161 The number of community groups per population are highest in the
poorer regions of the country i.e., the Northeast, South, and North, while being lowest in
the prosperous Bangkok metropolis [Appendix 25]. 162 Much to the yellow shirts’
chagrin, these generally poorer, rural areas are also strongholds of their red shirted rivals.
PAD politicians can no longer be in denial about the importance of the “rural”
vote. Although Thaksin’s election victories were in part achieved by “bribing gullible
rural voters,” it would be a foolish to believe that he alone utilized these election
tactics. 163 Thaksin was able to secure support, for his election and later reelection, by
appealing to the masses through social welfare. Despite his other flaws, he generally
delivered what he promised; each time his credibility strengthened in the eyes of the
public.
This strategy will be effective in the upcoming elections as well. Within the past
year, the current government’s passive reconciliation attempts have deteriorated its
credibility. The PAD is now in a position that demands that promises made to the public
must become more tangible.
CCT pilot programs would be effective instruments in this regard. Beginning
preparations for a series of social welfare pilot projects would surely appeal to the large
segment of voters that red shirt supported parties usually draw from. It would prove to the
nation’s poor that any political party with a sound social welfare platform can do just as
much for Thailand as Puae Thai could.
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Design with Foresight
The beauty of a CCT design lies in its overall flexibility. While some
governments use CCTs as the key components in poverty alleviation mechanisms, other
nations conduct much smaller programs meant to fill in the gaps that existing social
welfare leaves behind. The roles of CCT programs in national social policy differ country
by country. Variations exist both in design as well as size. Even programs with similar
goals still differ across nations by varying targeting systems, evaluations, payment
mechanisms, etc. [Appendix 26].
As with many other cash transfer initiatives, an ideal approach for policymakers
to determine appropriate CCT designs for Thailand is to launch a number of pilot projects
with varying mechanisms and components. This is an effective strategy to mitigate
future risks and correctly adapt cash transfer programs into the nation’s social and
economic context. Trial runs give policymakers sufficient time and insight for tailoring
CCT programs to the strengths and weaknesses of their country. Furthermore, pilot
programs allow local and national administrations to familiarize themselves with the
CCT structure. Altogether these instruments are crucial for setting Thailand’s nationwide
trajectories accurately.
Strategic Locations
It would be especially beneficial for Thai policymakers to establish pilot
programs in the Northeast. Pilot programs there would be especially strategic for two
reasons. First, they would directly target the region with the greatest number of poor
provinces [Appendix 27]. Second, such pilot programs would reduce anti-government
influence in the red shirts’ support hub.
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Fortunately, there is a currently active program that can serve as precedent for
such an initiative. Since its launch in 2007, Plan de Consolidación Integral de La
Macarena’s (PCIM) carrot and stick approach has made significant impacts towards
reducing insurgency as well as cocoa cultivation in Colombia’s eastern region of La
Macarena, a traditional stronghold of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). 164 The program has led to significant improvements in infrastructure, including
road expansion as well as introduction of computers to local schools. PCIM’s director,
Alvaro Balcázar, believes that several strategic allocations of social programs and armed
government forces are enough to bring about FARC’s total collapse. 165
PCIM serves as a reminder that soft power counter-insurgency efforts are
effective. Thailand’s civil unrest has not yet escalated to the same proportions as armed
conflict in Colombia. However, the possibility of such events happening in Thailand’s
future should not be underestimated. Appropriate soft-power measures could be
undertaken to ameliorate national discontent in the immediate, potentially reducing the
possibility as well as severity of future conflict.
Mechanisms
The most crucial objective is that support reaches the people its intended to reach.
Most social welfare programs have some form of screening process that determines
household eligibility. The accuracy of such mechanisms is especially important in nations
that require cash transfer programs as channels for alleviating inequality. Several key
factors affect CCT reliability, including: data collection processes, information
164
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management, household assessment mechanisms, institutional arrangements, and
monitoring mechanisms. 166
There is no single recommended blueprint for household targeting systems. A
large number of factors are involved in design and implementation of targeting
systems. 167 Thailand can test several potential designs through pilot projects. However,
most systems involve the same steps: collecting data on specific households via surveys,
entering data into one household information registry, comparing household
characteristics with pre-existing eligibility criteria, and establishing program-specific
beneficiary lists for the purpose of oversight and payroll [Appendix 28]. 168 The most
basic objectives for policymakers is to maximize target accuracy and process
transparency at reasonable administrative costs.
In Thailand’s context, proxy means testing (PMT) would be best. It is often used
in nations with high degrees of labor market informality. PMT has been successful in
several nations. Between 80–90 percent of benefits were received by the poorest 40
percent of households in Chile as well as Mexico. 169 In addition, combining PMT with
other types of targeting has been proven to increase accuracy. Regional targeting can be
used as a yardstick approach for prioritized registration. This could be done for a number
of Thailand’s poorest northeastern provinces.
Another crucial component of CCT program design is the type of process of
beneficiary registration the government chooses. Two main forms of the registration
process exist: 1) the on-demand application approach that relies on households to come to
166

Castañeda and others. “Designing and Implementing Household Targeting Systems: Lessons from Latin American
and the United States.”Social Protection Discussion Paper Series no. 0526. June 2005, v.
167
Ibid., 3.
168
Ibid., 2.
169
Ibid.,5.

54

local welfare office to apply for benefits i.e., self-targeting approach; 2) the quasiexhaustive survey approach that involves interviewing all households in particular areas,
thereby reducing the risks of missing potentially eligible households. Primarily, the
decision between two approaches depends on the concentration of poverty, and the extent
to which poverty is concentrated in particular areas [Appendix 29].
Marginally the quasi-exhaustive approach is about 30 percent cheaper than the
on-demand application method. On the other hand, the latter has an advantage of
lowering overall program costs. 170 Additionally, the on-demand method allows for a
dynamic as well as ongoing registry. It provides opportunities for people to come in and
out of the system. This aspect would be especially attractive to Thailand. Effectively, this
would decrease the government’s reliance on ad hoc interventions during times of
economic downturn. On other hand, random-sample spot checks would track unreported
improvements in economic status and apply appropriate penalties, thereby improving
overall cost-effectiveness of government CCT spending.
Strong mechanism for monitoring and oversight will be essential as well,
especially in regards to Thailand’s recent trends in decentralization. Overall error and
benefit leakage can be decreased through methods such as interview oversight, automated
checks against formal sector registries, and randomized quality control. 171 In Brazil and
Mexico computerized registries improved targeting practices and increased overall
program efficiency. 172
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Thailand’s own progress in data systems and research capacity as well as social
welfare implementation and monitoring has allowed the nation to improve its national
human welfare indicators. 173 Despite progress much remains to be done. Although the
National Statistical Office (NSO) conducts socio-economic household surveys every two
years, no comprehensive data system exists for the majority of Thailand’s poor i.e.,
informal sector workers and their dependants.
CCTs and the NSO can mutually benefit one another. CCTs can utilize available
NSO data in a number of ways. For example, NSO information could be useful for
identifying geographic priority areas. In addition, policymakers are able to use NSO’s
socio-economic questionnaire as a guides to creating households surveys for proxy means
testing. Country-specific samples provide officials vital insight for targeting operations.
Most importantly, the NSO and other government departments provide CCT designers
common characteristics of Thailand’s lower income population. This information can be
used to establish eligibility criteria for the program through which household
characteristics are compared to after unified registries are assembled [Appendix 30].
CCT household registries have potential to assist the NSO as well since the
unified household registry would include information on all CCT candidates regardless of
their eligibility status. This would contribute to Thailand’s establishment of a unified
national database for informal sector workers and their families. Ultimately, a
computerized data system would facilitate the implementation and evaluation of other
policies reforms, in addition to improving national welfare assessment accuracy.
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Determining Financial Commitments
Cost constraints are undoubtedly the largest obstacle that governments face in
design, especially when demand exceeds available resources. 174 Many agencies compete
for the limited resources of a government. Although cash transfer programs have
incredible potential in increasing overall human welfare, it is important for policymakers
to keep the price tag of such social welfare projects in mind.
This inevitably raises questions over the financial feasibility of implementing
CCT programs in Thailand. In order to determine program quotas, the government must
allot a certain percent of the annual fiscal budget toward CCTs. 175 To do this, Thailand
must find equitable ways of establishing such distribution quotas. Further, this question
tackles the issue of size and scope. In this aspect, assessment of pilot programs once
again can aid the government in establishing financial parameters for larger initiatives.
Variations exist both in design as well as size. Coverage can be as small as 1
percent of the population i.e., Cambodia; or as large as 40 percent of the population in
others countries. 176 Further, the sizes of cash transfers vary in generosity. Some benefits
are as small as 1 percent of mean household consumption, while some programs, such as
Mexico’s Oportunidades, generously provide up to 20 percent of mean household
consumption. 177

174

Castañeda and others, 12.
Past assessments conducted by the World Bank suggest program quotas instead of registration quotas. Registration
quotas are not recommended because they result in higher rates of exclusion since data is not compared to a nationwide
registry. These quotas also decrease credibility and trust in the system, especially if field officers freely exercise their
own discretion in determining eligibility criteria. Consequently, this could lead to bribery, lack of transparency, as well
as a decrease in overall program effectiveness (Ibid).
176
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Despite impacts of the recent economic downturn, the Thai government is
committed to continue its expansionary fiscal policy through 2011. In response to a UN
questionnaire on public expenditure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that social
expenditure on social welfare has significantly increased between 2008 and 2010. 178
By early 2011, a limited amount of free transportation and utility provisions
benefited the rural poor. Welfare initiatives such as free public transport and tap water
were applicable primarily to urban areas. 179 On the other hand, rural Thais did benefit
from ostensibly free electricity provisions. At present, families are not charged for
electricity if household consumption does not exceed a cost of 300 baht per month.
More remains to be done. Presently, the poorest segment of the population lives
on a day to day basis. For example, the percent of total expenditure to total income is 84
percent in the Northeast compared to 68.5 percent in the Greater Bangkok area
[Appendix 31].180 Accordingly, the highest household costs reported among the poor in
Khon Kaen were for transportation and food. CCTs can have potential to significantly
raise the consumption floor of impoverished by putting money into the hands of people
that need it most.

Calculations
In order to gain a general understanding of cash transfer costs in Thailand,
estimates are converted into household monthly quotas. Most recent NSO socio178

“Thailand’s response to questionnaire on recent adjustment of public expenditure and the impact on those who live
in poverty.” http://www.mfa.go.th/humanrights/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=107:thailandsresponses-to-questionnaire-on-recent-adjustment-of-public-expenditure-and-the-impact-on-those-who-live-inpoverty&catid=35:un-resolution&Itemid=73 (accessed April 19, 2011).
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economic data defines the national poverty line at 1,443 baht per person per month. 181
Multiplying the stated income, the estimated monthly household budget of Thai families
living at the national poverty line is 7,215 baht per month. 182
As of 2007, 8.5 percent of the population i.e., 5.4 out of 63.9 million people, lived
below the national poverty line. Allotting the poorest portion of the population into
household units, 1.08 million households would be considered living in poverty. It is
assumed that the program has 100 percent targeting efficiency.
In order to get a rough estimate of program costs, assume that Thai cash transfer
beneficiaries are given 5 percent of their monthly household consumption. This
percentage falls well within the known cash transfer generosity range. Therefore, the
average household’s cash transfer would be 360.75 baht per month, or 4,329 baht per
year. All in all, cash transfer programs under this rough estimate amount to
4,675,320,000 baht in annual expenditure. This amount is then adjusted to account for
inflation from 2007 to 2011, making cash transfer allotment needs approximately
5,130,228,636 baht. 183
The total government budget for the 2011 fiscal year is 1.12 trillion. 184 Excluding
administrative costs, cash transfer payments are a little over 0.2 percent of the
government’s total budget allotment for the current year. Accordingly, cash transfer

181

Somchai and Son, 12.
For the purpose of calculating cash transfer amounts it is reasonable to take the mean size of all households
interviewed i.e., five individuals. This would also be consistent with Thailand’s household poverty trends. Specifically,
poverty has been found to increase monotonically with household size, accounting for the larger proportion of
dependents i.e., young children, the elderly, and the disabled (Kakwani and Krongkaew, 6).
183
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would use less than .74 percent of the 2011 government budget for undesignated
commitments.
During the initial phases of adoption, CCTs may have high administrative costs.
In the beginning, a majority of resources are spent on targeting and monitoring
mechanisms. Lowering costs through reductions in targeting and monitoring is not
advised since these practices ultimately undermine the programs overall efficiency.
Fortunately, monitoring and targeting becomes easier over time, leading to a
reduction in administrative costs. For example, in 1997, targeting costs represented 65
percent of Mexico’s total CCT administrative costs. 185 By 2000, targeting costs fell to 11
percent and the largest cost component were the actual transfers (41 percent). 186 The
initial costs are small to the overall benefit to society. Especially considering that there
are now dozens of nations that have effective as well as cost-effective CCTs in progress.
Conclusion: Holistic Solutions for Thailand
In recent years, there has been significant government effort towards enhancing
the security of most vulnerable groups of Thai people. For example, free universal health
care has improved the quality of life and security for a large portion of the population. 187
In addition, the informal sector pension plan, now under serious consideration, would
represent another landmark development in social security. 188 Despite several
accomplishments, much remains to be done for the state of human welfare in Thailand.
CCTs provide short- as well as long-term solution to issues of inequality and
poverty, prevalent in developing capitalist societies. These new-generation social safety
185

Son, Hyun H. “Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: An Effective Tool for Poverty Alleviation?” Asian
Development Bank Economics and Research Department Policy Brief Series no. 51 (July 2008), 5.
186
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187
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188
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net mechanisms can vitally contribute to Thai society by addressing several key issues
simultaneously.
The immediate impacts of CCTs include alleviating household poverty by raising
the consumption ceilings of poor families. Moreover the additional income provided by
government aid also reduces income stress and facilitates a domestic environment more
conducive to proper child development. Additionally, CCT implementation has great
potential in improving relations between the government and public, thereby reducing
social conflict and creating an environment promotive of other policy reforms.
Ultimately, inter-generational transmission of poverty is reduced by elevating
low-income youth to education, health, and nutrition levels of wealthier children via CCT
incentives. CCT programs effectively even the “playing field” for young generations,
leading to improvements in class mobility among impoverished socioeconomic groups.
The positive correlation between human capital and economic growth has been
established through numerous cross-country empirical studies; for example, primary and
secondary school enrollment rates are positively linked with overall economic growth. 189
At Thailand’s current stage of economic development, human capital investment must
accompany infusion of capital. Currently, Thailand is not realizing its full human capital
potential, leaving a large portion of the population poorly educated. Through CCTs, the
Thai government can engage the nation’s total human capital stock, thereby increasing
returns in domestic investment.
Old Siam has been plagued for years by poverty, social unrest, inequality, and
economic uncertainty. Years of prosperity under capitalism have masked the ugly truth,
189

Son (2010), 10.
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while civil unrest and global economic downturn have recently exposed it. Thailand
experiences precisely the combination of social ills which CCTs have been proven to
ameliorate. Ultimately, the nation must engage a well-developed approach to solving the
nation’s persisting problems. An appropriate CCT program can holistically address
poverty alleviation and human capital investment, offering equal opportunity to all
members of Thai society.
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Appendix 1

Source: Royal Thai Embassy, Washington, D.C.

Appendix 2

Source: Somchai and Son, 8.
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Appendix 3

Source: Somchai and Son, 58.

Appendix 4

Source: Sander and others, 3.
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Appendix 5
The Human Achievement Index (HAI) is the first human development index at the provincial level
that provides an overall assessment of Thailand’s human development. The participation index
consists of four indicators: voter turnout, community groups, households participating in local
groups, and household participating in social services. Provincial participation is ranked from
highest to lowest i.e., green corresponds to highest participation levels, while red indicates lowest
participation levels.

Source: Somchai and Son, 138.
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Appendix 6
The Human Achievement Index (HAI) is the first human development index at the provincial level
that provides an overall assessment of Thailand’s human development. The income index consists
of four indicators: household income, poverty incidence, households with debt, and income
disparity measured by the Gini coefficient. Provincial income is ranked from highest to lowest i.e.,
green correspond to highest income levels, while red indicates lowest income levels.

Source: Somchai and Son, 124.
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Appendix 7

Source: Ali, 3.
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Appendix 8

Source: Ali, 4.

Appendix 9

Source: Ali, 3.
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Appendix 10

Source: Jomo, 11.

Appendix 11

Source: Baker, 23.
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Appendix 12

Source: Son (2010), 14.

Appendix 13

Source: Thailand Human Development Report, UNDP 2009, 14.

Source: The 2008 Key Statistics of Thailand. National Statistical Office of Thailand.
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Appendix 14
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 24:
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working
hours and periodic holidays with pay.
Article 25:
1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.
2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children,
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Source: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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Appendix 15 A
Millennium Development Goals for Thailand

Appendix 15 B

Source: Thailand Millennium Development Goals, 9.
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Appendix 15 B
Millennium Development Goals for Thailand Continued.

Source: Thailand Millennium Development Goals, 10.
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Appendix 16 A

Source: Working Group to Prepare a National Report on Strengthening Policies on Social Safety
Nets. Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, October 18, 2000.
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Appendix 16 B

Source: Ibid.
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Appendix 16 C

Source: Ibid.
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Appendix 16 D

Source: Ibid.
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Appendix 17

Source: Somchai and Son, 14.

78

Appendix 18

Source: Baker, 88.
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Appendix 19

Source: Baker, 90.
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Appendix 20

Source: Son ( 2010), 9.

Appendix 21

Source: Christina Paxson and Norbert Schady, “Cognitive Development among Young Children in Ecuador: The
Roles of Wealth, Health, and Parenting.” Journal of Human Resources, 42-1 (2007), 49-84.
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Appendix 22

Source: The 2008 Key Statistics of Thailand, National Statistical Office of Thailand.
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Appendix 23

Source: Somchai and Son, 38.

Appendix 24

Source: The Cigarette Smoking and Alcoholic Drinking Behavior Survey 2004, 2007, National Statistical Office,
Ministry of Information and Technology

Source: The 2008 Key Statistics of Thailand, National Statistical Office of Thailand.
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Appendix 24 A

Source: The 2008 Key Statistics of Thailand, National Statistical Office of Thailand.

Appendix 25

Source: Baker, 16.
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Appendix 26

Source: Fiszbein and others, 37.
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Appendix 27
Over nearly 75 percent of the sub districts and over half of all villages and urban
blocks in the Northeast showed poverty incident rates at least 50 percent in
excess of national averages.

Source: Somchai, Jitsuchon.“Small Area Estimation Poverty Map for Thailand.” Paper presented at the SMERU
Research Institute and Ford Foundation International Seminar in Jakarta, December 1-2, 2004.
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Appendix 28

Source: Castañeda and others, 7.
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88

Source: Castañeda and others, 14.

Appendix 29

Appendix 30

Source: “Defining and Measuring poverty,” Poverty in Thailand, Office of the National Economic and Social
Development Board, 10.
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Appendix 31

Source: The 2008 Key Statistics of Thailand. National Statistical Office of Thailand.
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